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Index Terms-local market, DSO-TSO coordination, distribution network NOMENCLATURÊ π LSM Price cleared per node in the local market at the peak hour. q LSM Power cleared per node in the local market at the peak hour. π CASM Clearing price of ancillary services market. π LSM Clearing price of local services market. C Reinforcement capacity needed if DSO does not use local market (MW). h eq Equivalent service hours. q LSM Quantity of power cleared in the local market. S Set of time frames (hours) of DSO calling for services in one year. S + S for which DSO service is in the same direction of TSO actions needed to restore balance. S − S for which DSO service is in the opposite direction of TSO actions needed to restore balance.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
With high presence of DER in distribution networks, the need for coordination between the operations of the transmission and distribution networks becomes increasingly important.This study assesses two possible coordination schemes between TSO and DSOs: TSO Central Ancillary Services Market (CASM) and DSO Local Services Market (LSM) inspired by projects such as [1] , and studies such as [2] . In the CASM scheme, only the TSO has the rights to access DER services, whereas in LSM, DSOs lead the procurement of those services. The relevant factors that could create conflicts in DER services procurement between TSO and DSO have been amply discussed in [1] . A contribution of this paper is an analysis of the influence of key performance indicators, such as the available capacity of DER services, the uncertainty in DER bidding price and the reinforcement costs in the performance of a LSM. A set of metrics based on a definition of conflict price within the two coordination schemes have been formulated, including a new concept to assess the reinforcement cost in a case study: the Equivalent Service Hours. This parameter evaluates the contribution of the cost of local market in simulated day and its impact on DSOs reinforcement decisions. In this way, the research reported here extends previous work such as [3] , presenting a conflict pricing scheme involving TSO and DSO valuations of the services activated in a local market in the distribution network.
B. Services procured by DSO
The DSO services can be classified between overload services and voltage services; as fully identified in [4] those services and set of variants are properly identified. The DER providers for congestion services can be Demand Side Response (DSR), dispatchable generation or curtailable nondispatchable renewable generation (e.g. wind and solar). The curtailment of non-dispatchable generation is not usually desired, as free and clean energy is wasted, but it is costeffective when managing congestion in electrical networks [5] . In the literature there are multiple approaches to solve congestion in distribution networks. The idea of Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP), previously applied to transmission systems, is adapted to Distribution Locational Marginal Prices (DLMP) to maximize social welfare in distribution grids [6] . In this case, DLMP reflects the energy balance, losses, and the congestion costs. With large penetration of electric vehicles, some researchers seek to optimize congestion introducing the constraints associated with battery charging to the DLMP [7] , whereas with large penetration of distributed generation (DG) some studies use DLMP to optimally allocate new DG taking into account the voltage rise phenomena commonly associated to DGs [8] . The LSM proposed is based on DLMP, which is used to minimize the DSO services activation costs.
C. Services procured by TSO
The CASM proposed is based on the European model of reserve activation (secondary and tertiary reserve). Other Ancillary Services (AS), with a greater frequency of clearing (5 minutes according to SmartNet project [1] ) aimed that DERs can usually provide faster response than traditional big generators (5 minutes against 10 to 15 minutes) [9] .
D. Services market design
The proposed markets are activation markets, meaning that services are activated as needed in the basis of a contract. The activation can be manual or automated, according to the specification of the cyber-physical system [10] , [11] . The realtime activation market is a different solution to the approaches taken by most real-time markets in USA such as PJM [12] . It is also different to the EU EcoGrid project [13] where the system operator sends a shadow price signal to which the BRPs respond. For the purpose of designing the market framework, several coordination schemes between system operators are proposed in [14] . One of the coordination schemes is a LSM, which has been proposed similarly in other initiatives [4] , being the one in which the DSO takes a more active role. In the local market scheme, the DSO has the rights to procure services from DERs first, and the remaining offers can be sent later to TSO to participate in the CASM. The paper is organized as follows: in Section II the main metrics and formulation are presented, Section III presents the case study based on a real network in the UK. Finally results and main findings of the study are highlighted in Section IV.
II. METHODOLOGY Fig. 1 displays the timeline of the market actors in the LSM scheme. Note that the central TSO market runs in parallel with the local DSO market, hence the LSM scheme can be seen as a variant of the CASM scheme whereby the DSO procures first from is the leader procuring from the available services. On the DSO side, the LSM is cleared close to real time because congestion is often due to reverse power flow induced by volatile renewable energy generation (wind or solar) or uncertain sources of demand. Therefore, the DSO can procure the services more accurately according to the latest forecast available and the use of real time monitoring of the network state. Furthermore, DSOs are expected to increasingly implement automated control over market participants in the GB system. This capability is known as Active Network Management (ANM) [15] and it is being introduced partly to favor new connections of DERs in congested network areas. The flexibility services offered by DERs will usually be traded by an intermediary, commonly known as an aggregator, who aims to consolidate a portfolio of small flexibility resources in 
A. Equivalent service hours
A new concept is introduced in this study to normalize the annual reinforcement cost to the peak hour of the design day. The normalization parameter is referred to as equivalent service hours, and represents the proportion of cost of local services at peak hours with respect to the total annual cost of services.
h eq is a meaningful parameter due to the load duration curve of yearly stochastic demand and generation usually having steep downward slope. Moreover, the clearing price decreases when less services are contracted. That means most of the yearly services cost is concentrated in a few hours. In this way, the study of DSO local services the business case for DSO local services can be simplified to studying only the forecasted peak hour of the year. The normalized reinforcement can be stylized as:
Where R annualized is the annualized cost of the reinforcement decision avoided by the use of the LSM.
B. Metrics definition
Conflict prices: A conflict price is used to define the performance of DSO and TSO operations in LSM compared to the CASM scheme. The conflicts considered are: a) Reserve activation conflict (TSO conflict): TSO has to call additional services to restore the imbalance created by DSO in real time. In the LSM, no coordination of DSO service activation volume is expected with TSO. The annual balance of TSO conflict cost is:
The TSO conflict price is obtained normalizing the conflict cost in the annual peak hour toq LSM :
Where n is a binary variable that is 0 when service is in the same direction as TSO balancing actions and 1 if it is in the opposite.
b) Reinforcement expenditure conflict (DSO conflict): In the CASM scheme, the DSO cannot procure services, and therefore has to plan a more expensive reinforcement program. The annual balance of the DSO conflict cost is:
Normalizing (5) toq LSM * h eq the DSO conflict price is obtained for the peak hour of the year:
Profit at Risk of the Local Services Market: Profit at Risk (PaR) is proposed to measure the profitability of a Local Services Market. PaR is the quantile of the profit distribution of a portfolio and is commonly used to optimize generation portfolios. In this case, PaR will be used to estimate the sensitivity of the reinforcement cost ratio is the 5% quantile of the cases. The social welfare is defined as the sum of TSO and DSO conflict costs in (5) and (3), and the PaR is obtained by:
The PaR is proposed to be estimated for the best and the worst case scenario of key parameters: Reserved capacity, as the amount of capacity that is not available for DSO. High for Worst Case (WC) scenario and Low for Best Case (BC) scenario; π CASM : High for WC scenario and Low for BC scenario; DER bidding price in LSM: High for WC scenario and Low for BC scenario; Reinforcement cost: High for BC scenario and low for WC scenario.
C. Local Services Market model
The LSM has been modeled according to the following formulation:
subjected to:
where the objective function is set to minimize the activation cost of LSM. The last condition represents the nodal market clearing. For this study a pay-as-clear mechanism (DLMP) is used to settle the payments to the participants. The optimization problem was solved using the AC Optimal Power Flow (OPF) algorithm of PSSE coupled with an iterative algorithm aiming to include the market clearing constraint. Note that as the second derivative of the optimization function can be positive or negative [16] , therefore there exist more than one local optimum solutions and the problem optimization is nonconvex. There exist several techniques to obtain the global optimum in this kind of problem [17] , however for this study obtaining a local minimum solution is acceptable.
D. Monte Carlo Simulation
Monte Carlo methods are widely used to make probabilistic analyses based on random sampling. In this study Monte Carlo Simulations (MCS) are used to simulate the possible scenarios of the two markets combined, taking into account the uncertainty of the key parameters defined in II-B.
III. CASE STUDY DEFINITION
The methodology has been applied to a 33kV network in the Cornwall area in the UK with an additional DER deployment capacity of 250 MW in 2030, mostly Photovoltaic and Wind generators. The new generation capacity has been split in 9 nodes representing the 33/11kV substations, according to a proportional allocation of the generation headroom available. The case study network is shown in Fig. 3 , depicted with the constraint violations in the peak hour of the year. It can be seen that 5 transformers and 3 lines present thermal overloads and there exist some voltage violations. All the constraints happen in power flow reverse mode, i.e. Fig. 2 . Case study network. Red: Thermal constraints. Light blue: Voltage constraints excess generation, therefore the services will most likely be provided by curtailment of generation during peak periods. For model simplification, it has been assumed that the network can perform with N-0 redundancy level; and the reinforcement cost has been calculated using a ratio between £50,000/MVA and £300,000/MVA, with a linear depreciation during a period of 40 years [3] . The main service contracted to avoid congestion is a Turn UP service, i.e. an increase in demand or a decrease in generation. As there is no significant amount of flexible demand deployed such as electric vehicles, the main services providers will be the generators offering curtailment services. The bidding price of the generators to decrease consumption must reflect the loss of market price revenue plus a premium (considering that they are remunerated by the net energy generated). A mean price between £60-90/MWh can be expected [18] . For the CASM clearing price, values between £50-70/MWh are taken based on current schemes [19] for the Turn Up service, and £80-130/MWh for the Turn Down service. The prices have been modelled using a normal distribution with a variation coefficient of variation CV = 0.18 heuristically chosen for illustration. The two scenarios are described in the next table, where TU and TD refers to Turn Up and Turn Down respectively: 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Local Services Market results Fig. 3 represents the correlation between the quantities cleared per node for reserved capacity levels of 0%, 20% and 40% in the high bid price scenario. The scatterplot matrix plots the quantities cleared at each node against others. In the diagonal of the matrix, a boxplot graph represents the dispersion for each node. A strong correlation can be seen between nodes 1 and 2 for levels of reserved capacity below 40% and between 3 and 4 for all levels of reserved capacity. Those nodes are in a similar spatial position, which makes them suitable to compete for the same assets. In 3 of the 4 nodes the case with more reserved capacity (40%) has a higher mean value and a lower dispersion. In the case of nodes 1 and 2, they have almost no dispersion, so probably all the available bids are activated. Therefore, a high level of reserved bids that the DSO cannot use results in a higher quantity procured, and therefore in a lower market efficiency. Fig. 4 shows the solution space for the TSO and DSO conflict price. The synergy zone is defined for the cases when the conflict price is positive for both actors, i.e. both have positive impact. Those are represented with blue color. The positive conflict zone exists when TSO conflict price is negative, but the benefit for DSO is greater than the loss for TSO. It is represented with green color. The red zones are the nobody wins; even if TSO conflict price is positive (second quadrant) this is not an advantage from the CASM scheme. From left to right the worst-case scenario and the best-case scenario are displayed. On the worst-case scenario, the synergy zone and positive social welfare (positive conflict zone) add up to 66.7% of the total simulated cases, where in the best case scenario the positive impact of DSO is much greater than the negative impact of TSO. The major difference on the DSO side is due to the uncertainty of reinforcement cost, which is the parameter that adds more uncertainty to the result. Therefore, it can be concluded that Local Service Market scheme under current considerations has a higher social welfare potential than Centralized Ancillary Services Market scheme.
B. Conflict price results
C. PaR of Social Welfare
Recalling the definition of social welfare in Section II-B, the results of Profit at Risk scenario analysis in Fig. 5 show that below 35 equivalent service hours (h eq ) the profitability of procuring LSM services emerges to be considered in the worstcase scenario. Across the whole range of the reinforcement cost ratio in the worst-case scenario there is a feasible region of h eq , which means the reinforcement decision is a tradeoff between reinforcement costs and the amount of services procured per year. These two parameters can vary considerably depending on grid topologies and diversity of the demand and generation connected, but DSOs are in a position to adapt this methodology to each case study having the necessary information . The two market designs modeled represent the ordering position of the DSO or the TSO in procuring services from the DER facilities. A set of novel metrics for evaluating conflict prices have been defined, including a new concept to assess the reinforcement cost in a case study: the Equivalent Service Hours. This provides a valid indicator to facilitate DSOs reinforcement decisions. For the case study and with the assumptions made, it is concluded that LSM has more potential to maximize social welfare than CASM. Furthermore, the capacity of services available should be maximized, as it has major impact in the local market performance (in a pay-as-clear design). Since the social welfare has positive regions even in the worst case scenario, this means that a trade-off of services volume and network reinforcement will be particular to each case study. Further studies could be focused on better defining the reinforcement cost, and on studying the conflict relief with a better coordination. This could include, for example, an intraday communication of expected volume activated. Overall, potential savings have been found with LSM framework, which could decrease network charges on the end-consumers bills, facilitating a major deployment of renewable energy technologies.
